McMenemy Seminar: Emma Curran – In Defence of the Identified Victim Bias

Wed 20th Feb, 18:30 Bridgetower Room

Bridgetower Room

Abstract:

We often demonstrate a willingness to give a large portion of our resources to save identified lives. This sometimes manifests itself in high-cost rescue attempts – the recent Tham Luang cave rescue is but one example. In healthcare this manifests itself in the resources we invest in developing medical treatments for individuals known to be suffering from diseases. However, these individuals aren’t the only ones in need of
aid. There are thousands of statistical lives at stake. This year, many, presently undetermined, people will develop fatal diseases whose death we could have prevented by investing in preventative healthcare. Also, given that preventative healthcare tends to be more cost-effective than treatment and rescue options, we should expect to save more lives by investing our resources into preventative healthcare. Such considerations give rise to an odd fact: we are biased towards identified persons to the detriment of statistical persons, let’s call this the Identified Victim Bias. By continuing to invest in medical treatments and emergency rescues, we forgo saving a certain number of statistical lives in favour of saving fewer identified lives.

Contra the existing literature, I attempt to justify the Identified Victim Bias. I do so by arguing that if we accept a popular normative decision-making procedure – contractualism – then the bias is not just permissible but morally required. I proceed by outlining two variants of contractualism. I demonstrate that one variant supports the bias, whilst the other does not. I then argue, by way of a dilemma, that the second variant of contractualism is untenable. Consequently, my argument also contributes to the debate regarding contractualism and risk.

This talk is open to all.

Sherry, orange juice and water will be served.